























8. Hearing abducted children in Court –
A comparative point of view from three
countries (Belgium, France & the
Netherlands)
By Sara Lembrechts (University of Antwerp (Belgium))1
Introduction
This paper summarises the findings of a legal study con-
ducted within the framework of the multidisciplinary
research project "EWELL – Enhancing the Well-being of
Children in Cases of International Child Abduction".2 The
legal study comprised two elements; a “quick scan” of
national legislation on the child’s right to be heard in
28 European Union (EU) countries, and an in-depth ana-
lysis of case law from Belgium, France and the Nether-
lands focussing on the hearing of children in child
abduction cases under the Hague Child Abduction Con-
vention and the Brussels IIa Regulation. The case law ana-
lysis is the predominant focus of this paper. Where
relevant, examples from the “quick scan” will be provided
to situate the findings within a wider European context.
After a brief overview of the research methodology, the
paper addresses some of the key findings on how children
are heard in abduction proceedings. The second part of
the paper takes a closer look at two issues that particularly
stroke our attention; the courts’ assessment of objections
to return and elements of the child’s maturity. The paper
concludes with a brief critical reflection.
Research methodology for the case law analysis
In the case law analysis, we examined court rulings on
hearing children during legal proceedings following an in-
ternational child abduction (as defined under the Hague
Convention and the Brussels IIa Regulation). All cases were
decided by family courts at first instance, regional or na-
tional Appeal courts and Supreme courts in Belgium,
France and The Netherlands. The project was limited to
the study of cases that had been decided between March
2005, when the Brussels IIa Regulation entered into force,
and March 2016, the starting date of the EWELL-project.
The study focussed on those cases where judicial officers
explicitly referred to or made a determination on whether a
child should be heard in return proceedings, irrespective of
whether or not the hearing actually took place
The sample consisted of a total of 176 cases, subjected to
various research questions in order to assess the way in
which judges approach the hearing of abducted children
and its implications, namely:
- What reasons form the basis of the judges’
decision as to whether the child will be heard or
not?
- Does the court provide any information on how the
hearing took place?
- Does the court decision offer any insight into the
personality and / or the behaviour of the child?
- Was the child’s opinion decisive for the court’s
decision, and why?
- Is there a difference in approach between Hague
cases and the Brussels II a Regulation cases when
determining if a child should be heard?
- Are there any other matters relevant to understand
a court’s procedure on hearing children in cases of
parental abduction?
The databases used to find the cases differed for each
country. INCADAT was systematically consulted for all
three jurisdictions. In the Netherlands, most cases were
published on the website “www.rechtspraak.nl”. Accessing
Belgian and French case law however was more challen-
ging, as many judgments are not published online or made
publicly available elsewhere. As a consequence, the study
also includes non-full-text references. In some cases, child
abduction lawyers and judges were particularly helpful in
providing anonymised, unpublished decisions. All the
cases retrieved were analysed using Excel or NVivo, a
software for qualitative data analysis.
The child’s age and maturity in Belgium, France and
the Netherlands
The number of cases in the sample where the judge
referred to the hearing of the child, irrespective of whether
the hearing actually took place, varied considerably
between the three jurisdictions. For the Netherlands, there
were 98 cases, for Belgium 25 and for France 53. For the
Netherlands, children were allowed to be heard in
81 cases, or approximately 82% of cases where reference
to the hearing of the child was made; children were heard
in only 6 Belgian cases (24%) and in 24 of the French cases
(45%). However, the number of cases in which the objec-
tions of the child were decisive in the order not to return
the child (i.e., application of Art. 13(2) of the 1980 Hague
Child Abduction Convention) is relatively similar amongst
the three jurisdictions, varying between 16% in the Nether-
lands (16 cases), 12% in Belgium (3 cases) and 11% in France
(6 cases).
The main reason for the great disparity between the three
jurisdictions in the number of cases where children are
heard is the minimum age at which judges consider chil-
dren capable of being heard in such proceedings. In the
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Netherlands, children from 6 years onwards are given an
opportunity to express their views. In Belgium, courts gen-
erally permit children 10 years or older to be heard. In
France, our analysis found that children younger than
9 were not heard, with the exception of 6-8 year olds who
had older siblings. As most children are abducted when
they are young, the Dutch courts have a significantly higher
number of cases where the child was heard.
The three jurisdictions are further distinguished by how
their respective courts assess a child’s maturity. Even
though the assessment of maturity should be analysed on
a case-by-case basis for every child, Belgian and French
courts do not elaborate on the concept of maturity or “dis-
cernement” in their case law. Both jurisdictions generally
refrain from a detailed assessment of the child’s maturity
and use biological age as a criterion to decide whether or
not the child should be heard. Dutch judges, on the other
hand, extensively discuss their views on the child’s maturity
in individual cases. The Dutch case law differentiates
between several age categories: children below the age of
9 are usually considered immature. Although they are
heard, their views are not decisive. Children who are 11 and
beyond are considered mature enough and due weight
can be given to their views. However, this does not neces-
sarily imply that the court will follow the child’s views. For
example, when the child suffers from a loyalty conflict, he
or she can be mature enough to be heard (in the sense of
his / her ‘capacity’ to be heard), but his / her views will not
be decisive for the outcome of the case.
Minimum ages at which children are heard in the rest
of Europe
The results from the “quick scan” demonstrate that there is
an obligation to hear children in all EU jurisdictions, subject
to a variable minimum age. A total of 14 jurisdictions spe-
cify a minimum age for the possibility to hear a child in any
legal proceedings (see the graph below), whereas the law
of 15 jurisdictions does not stipulate a minimum age.
Note that the total number of jurisdictions is 29 instead of 28 – this is
because England & Wales do not have minimum ages whereas
Scotland does.
These figures relate to the hearing of children generally in
legal proceedings. In abduction proceedings, the minimum
age a child can be heard is sometimes lower. In the Neth-
erlands, where children are in principle heard in legal pro-
ceedings from the age of 12, judges have allowed children
to be heard at the age of 6 in abduction cases. In Belgium,
children from 12 onwards are invited to be heard, but chil-
dren aged 10 and 11 can be heard occasionally in abduc-
tion proceedings. French law, on the contrary, does not
provide for a minimum age at which a child can be heard.
Concentration of jurisdiction
Another structural reason that may explain why Dutch
courts are more familiar with hearing children is its con-
centration of jurisdiction. In the Netherlands, there is only
one first instance court dealing with child abduction cases,
which is based in The Hague. Accordingly, fewer judges
deal with abduction cases, implying that they have gained
experience and expertise on the subject matter. In Belgi-
um, whilst there exists specialised family courts at first in-
stance, there are 6 courts dealing with abduction cases in
Antwerp, Brussels, Ghent, Liège and Eupen. In France,
there is no concentration of jurisdiction at first instance
level; any first instance courts can deal with child abduc-
tion cases. Whilst the data shows that concentration of
jurisdiction might not have an influence on the number of
cases where return is actually refused on the grounds of
Art. 13(2) of the Hague Child Abduction Convention, judges
in concentrated jurisdictions may feel less insecure or
hesitant towards hearing children, because they do it much
more often.
In the rest of Europe, of the 16 countries where this inform-
ation was available, 8 countries concentrate jurisdiction,
like in the Netherlands. 4 countries have found a middle
ground (e.g., Belgium), and in another 4 countries there is

























A strict interpretation of the child’s objections to
return
Children’s objection to return have been interpreted strictly
in all three jurisdictions analysed in the study. The quantit-
ative data also illustrates this; only between 11% and 16% of
cases where children are heard was Article 13(2) of the
Hague Child Abduction Convention applied. Such an as-
sessment poses a huge dilemma for the judge. Whereas
the views of the child is one of a variety of factors con-
sidered by the court in return proceedings, there are a
number of instances in the case law where more weight
was given to the child’s objection.
For example, when an objection is explicit ("firm and con-
sistent", conscious, sustained) (Netherlands, Belgium,
France), it is more likely that judges will treat it as a serious
ground for non-return. Objection has also justified non-
return where the reasons for the objection are not limited
to a preference for living in one country or the personality
of one parent, but rather take into account the circum-
stances, the context and likely impact of return (Nether-
lands, Belgium, France). If the objection is confirmed in
other sources at the court’s disposal (Netherlands, Belgium,
France), such as materials from the hearing of other parties,
or documents from child welfare authorities, the child’s
views are also given more weight. Other reasons include
when the objections relate to the child’s healthy develop-
ment (Netherlands); when the objection goes beyond a
mere preference to keep the status quo (Netherlands);
when the child takes initiative to stay in contact with the
other parent (Netherlands); when the objection is not
merely based on factual circumstances that make the
country ‘safer’ or ‘nicer’ (like traffic, comfortable school etc.)
(Netherlands); and when the child does not suffer from a
loyalty conflict (France).
Whilst determining if a child should be heard and what
weight should be given to the child’s views is an extremely
difficult and challenging task for judges, the case law has
demonstrated that judges attempt to move beyond
superficial or inconsistent objections and try to capture, as
good as they can, what the long-term implications of a
decision are for the child concerned.
Assessing children’s maturity
The views of a child can be decisive to determine the out-
come of the case when the court finds the child has
reached sufficient age and maturity. Where determining at
what age a child should be heard already poses consider-
able challenges to the courts, the assessment of maturity
is even more controversial. Unlike Belgian and French
courts, who do not elaborate on maturity or discernement
in the case law at our disposal (with the exception of an
occasional reference to authenticity), Dutch courts have
made a concerted effort to elaborate their assessment of
abducted children’s maturity in their jurisprudence.
Analysing the available cases, we could compile an over-
view of the various conditions that Dutch courts take into
account when assessing the child’s maturity. Not all con-
ditions must be satisfied for the child’s views to be influen-
tial in the outcome of the proceedings, but the more a
child’s manner of speech and behaviour corresponded to
the factors listed below, the more likely their views im-
pacted the outcome of the case. The factors included:
- Ability to sufficiently oversee and understand the
current situation as well as future consequences
of a decision or preference on where to live
(referenced in 16 cases);
- Ability to express one’s wishes verbally (if needed
assisted by an interpreter) and voice one’s
thoughts, feelings and emotions in a clear and
comprehensive way (referenced in 10 cases);
- Ability to convey a certain degree of consistency
in the story (referenced in 10 cases);
- Authenticity, self-reflexivity and independence
corresponding to the child’s age (referenced in
9 cases); or the ability to make independent
decisions (referenced in 4 cases);
- Ability to speak in age-appropriate language
(referenced in 4 cases), in his or her own words
(referenced in 1 case) and with words through
which the child can understand the implications
(referenced in 1 case: the child spoke in terms of
‘running away’ or ‘committing suicide’, where the
judge was of the impression that the child did not
understand the implications of these actions);
- Ability to convey a sense of reality, thoroughness
and/or detail in expressing his or her views
(referenced in 4 cases);
- Ability to speak freely, openly and spontaneously
(referenced in 3 cases);
- Ability to give reasons for a certain choice or
preference (referenced in 3 cases);
- Ability to speak in a way that is not overly
emotional (reference in 1 case where a strong
expression of anger was considered a sign of
insufficient maturity);
- Give an impression of maturity, e.g. seeming more
mature than other children of the same age
(referenced in 3 cases). It is worth noting the court
explicitly states that maturity is not related to the
extent to which a child feels responsible or
‘pretends’ to be older than he or she is (referenced
in 1 case).
Whereas most elements to assess maturity are related to
speaking abilities, behaviour is also considered (referenced
in 5 cases), especially in cases involving younger children
(5 to 7 years old) or children with a specific medical back-
ground (mental or behavioural problems). In one case, for
example, the court pointed out that a 6-year-old child was
uncomfortable when people spoke Spanish around him.























Intelligence (in the sense of schooling level) is rarely used
to assess maturity (referenced in 1 case). Children who are
shy, not particularly confident or persuasive in their speech
and behaviour face more difficulty in convincing the court
that they are sufficiently mature (referenced in 4 cases).
In one case involving a 13.5-year-old boy who made a sig-
nificantly mature impression, the court explicitly stated that
it is irrelevant whether the child speaks the full truth when
reporting about the situation in his country of habitual res-
idence if it is clear to the court that the way in which he
experiences the situation is authentic and consistent. It
follows that truth or objectivity are important only in cases
of younger children, of a loyalty conflict, of undue influ-
ence by the parent or for any other reason that may raise
doubts concerning the authenticity of the child’s opinion,
but are not so relevant when there is no doubt about the
child’s maturity.
Loyalty-conflicts or undue influence by one of the parents
(usually the current caregiver, i.e. taking or retaining parent)
are generally indications for the court not to follow the
child’s views (referenced in 5 cases). A loyalty-conflict is
sometimes considered a sign of insufficient maturity (ref-
erenced in 8 cases). However, exceptions apply when the
court can identify the child’s independent ability to form an
authentic opinion. Children who are under obvious social
and emotional pressure can still be considered mature,
even if their opinion is not decisive due to a loyalty-conflict.
For example, a 15-year-old girl who had insisted she
wanted to return to her other parent ever since she had
been abducted, but changed her mind a few days before
the hearing, was considered not insufficiently mature but
subject to a loyalty-conflict. Further, the more the child
portrays a situation in extreme terms, the less likely it is
that a court will take his or her views into account.
Critical reflection
Elements of maturity are mainly linked to rational and
verbal abilities, to speaking, to words and language.
However, considering Article 12 of the UNCRC, capacity to
form one’s own views is not limited to rational compet-
ences, but also involves moral, emotional and social capa-
city. Policy makers, practitioners and academics have
argued that as a minimum, children should not be as-
sessed on the basis of indicators or conditions in which
even most adults would fail to show sufficient under-
standing. This should make us particularly aware of the fact
that children who are shy, lack self-confidence or are not
as persuasive in their speech and behaviour, face more
difficulty in convincing the court that they are sufficiently
mature. Does that necessarily mean they are less able to
assess their own lives and understand consequences of a
decision? To that end, one may consider that assistance or
guidance from other professionals could be required to
explore and develop one’s views, in accordance with the
child’s evolving capacities and context, always putting the
burden of proof to assess maturity with the State, not with
the child.
1 With the cooperation and support of Prof. Thalia Kruger,
Prof. Wouter Vandenhole, Mrs. Hilde Demarré and Ms. Kim
Van Hoorde.
2 Disclaimer: The findings in this paper are part of the EWELL
research project on Enhancing the Well-being of Children in
Cases of International Child Abduction. EWELL ran between
January 2016 and December 2017, co-funded by the
European Commission, with partners in Belgium, The
Netherlands and France. The complete research report can
be downloaded here, a summary is available here.
9. The hearing of the child in civil proceedings
in Italy - Rules and practice
By Marzia Ghigliazza (avocat, secretary ICALI (Italian
Child Abduction Lawyers in Italy)) & Sara Luzzati
(avocat)
The hearing of the child in civil proceedings in Italy has
been effectively addressed through precise practical
guidelines, beginning with the Protocol prepared by the
Observatory on Civil Justice of Milano in 2006. The Protocol
supplements Law n. 54 of 8.02.2006, which first introduced
the possibility for the Judge to hear the child in separation
and divorce procedures (Article 155 sexies of the Italian Civil
Code).1 Nonetheless, Art. 155 sexies did not provide any
specific rule regarding the hearing.
Following amendments in 2012 and 2013,2 the Italian Civil
Code today expressly recognises the compulsory right of
the child to be heard in any matter or procedure concern-
ing him or her (Article 315 bis, comma 3). A series of rules
are incorporated in the Code for the judicial hearing of the
child in any proceeding where decisions affecting him or
her are to be taken.3 The rules contained in Law n. 54 since
2013 have been adopted and transposed following the
Court’s Protocols drawn throughout the country, starting
with the first one in Milano.
The “Milano Protocol” was drafted between February and
June 2016 by a working group of members of family law
specialised associations, namely Camera Minorile and AIAF
(Associazione Italiana degli Avvocati per la famiglia e per i
minori), with support from psychological and pedagogical
experts. The Protocol was subsequently agreed to by the
Family, Minor and Appeal Court.
